sha,message,author_date,committer_date,raw_author,raw_author_label,raw_committer,raw_committer_label,repo,repo_label,author,author_label,committer,committer_label
1fc75809a6aa17860944b4cc3a4d7175cd53b1f4,"Refactored everything into a factory function

I now call a factory function to construct the Sanic app:

    app = app_factory(files)

This allows me to pass additional arguments to it, e.g. the files to serve.

Also refactored my class-based views to accept jinja as an argument, e.g:

    app.add_route(
        TableView.as_view(jinja),
        '/<db_name:[^/]+>/<table:[^/]+?><as_json:(.jsono?)?$>'
    )",2017-11-05T02:13:44Z,2017-11-05T02:13:44Z,2946d096d0cdefdc017559e6b57e87658736e843,Simon Willison,2946d096d0cdefdc017559e6b57e87658736e843,Simon Willison,107914493,datasette,9599,simonw,9599,simonw
31b21f5c5e15fc3acab7fabb170c1da71dc3c98c,"Moved all SQLite queries to threads

SQLite operations are blocking, but we're running everything in Sanic, an
asyncio web framework, so blocking operations are bad - a long-running DB
operation could hold up the entire server.

Instead, I've moved all SQLite operations into threads. These are managed by a
concurrent.futures ThreadPoolExecutor. This means I can run up to X queries in
parallel, and I can continue to queue up additional incoming HTTP traffic
while the threadpool is busy.

Each thread is responsible for managing its own SQLite connections - one per
database. These are cached in a threadlocal.

Since we are working with immutable, read-only SQLite databases it should be
safe to share SQLite objects across threads. On this assumption I'm using the
check_same_thread=False option. Opening a database connection looks like this:

    conn = sqlite3.connect(
        'file:filename.db?immutable=1',
        uri=True,
        check_same_thread=False,
    )

The following articles were helpful in figuring this out:

* https://pymotw.com/3/asyncio/executors.html
* https://marlinux.wordpress.com/2017/05/19/python-3-6-asyncio-sqlalchemy/

Closes #45. Refs #38.",2017-11-05T02:21:44Z,2017-11-05T02:21:44Z,2946d096d0cdefdc017559e6b57e87658736e843,Simon Willison,2946d096d0cdefdc017559e6b57e87658736e843,Simon Willison,107914493,datasette,9599,simonw,9599,simonw
186c513a61a091b9f83d788e25b08f41a84ed9a3,"Support parameterized SQL and block potentially harmful queries

You can now call arbitrary SQL like this:

    /flights?sql=select%20*%20from%20airports%20where%20country%20like%20:c&c=iceland

Unescaped, those querystring params look like this:

    sql = select * from airports where country like :c
    c = iceland

So SQL can be constructed with named parameters embedded in it, which will
then be read from the querystring and correctly escaped.

This means we can aggressively filter the SQL parameter for potentially
dangerous syntax. For the moment we enforce that it starts with a SELECT
statement and we ban the sequence ""pragma"" from it entirely.

If you need to use pragma in a query, you can use the new named parameter
mechanism.

Fixes #39",2017-11-05T02:49:18Z,2017-11-05T02:49:18Z,2946d096d0cdefdc017559e6b57e87658736e843,Simon Willison,2946d096d0cdefdc017559e6b57e87658736e843,Simon Willison,107914493,datasette,9599,simonw,9599,simonw